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Abstract 
 
Using the Latinobarómetro survey, this paper examines Latin Americans’ 
perceptions of the IDB, the World Bank and the IMF. The study analyzes how 
people’s knowledge and evaluation of these multilateral organizations are affected 
by the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, the 
country where they live, the financial position of the IDB in that country, 
macroeconomic conditions and interviewees’ political orientation and attitudes 
towards democracy and free markets. The results indicate both good and bad 
news for the IDB. Negatively, it is the least-known of the three international 
organizations; but positively, it is the best rated among those familiar with them. 
Demographic variables and socioeconomic levels are important determinants of 
who knows these organizations. In terms of grading, the demographic 
characteristics of the respondent seem to have no impact. Conversely, economic 
status, macroeconomic conditions (to some extent), and the political orientation of 
the respondent are significant determinants of people’s evaluation. 
 
   4
1. Introduction 
 
The regionwide economic downturn of 1998-2002 increased antagonism in Latin America 
toward the “Washington consensus” and its main proponents. Perceived results of economic 
reforms in the 1990s, which were supported strongly by international organizations, especially 
the IMF, were disappointing. As a result, the image of these institutions suffered and they 
became more unpopular. Given this context at a time of transformation for the Bank, it is 
instructive and important to understand what people in our region think of the IDB.  
This paper addresses that question by using results from the Latinobarometro survey. 
This public poll offers an invaluable source of information about Latin Americans’ opinions of 
politics, institutions and economics, perceptions about individual well-being, and public attitudes 
toward free markets and democracy. It has been held annually since 1995 in as many as 18 Latin 
American countries.
1  
The analysis of this paper is based on a question included in the 2001 survey, in which 
interviewees were presented with a list of institutions and asked to identify those with which they 
were familiar and to grade each on a 1-to-10 scale (with 1 being “very bad” and 10 being “very 
good”). The list included the IDB, the World Bank and the IMF, among others.
2 Unfortunately 
these organizations were included only in that year’s survey, so it is not possible to study 
changes in people’s opinion over time. Similar questions were asked in other years (1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2003) but the list of institutions included neither the IDB nor the World Bank.
3 This 
study examines how people’s knowledge and evaluation of these multilateral organizations are 
affected by the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, the country 
or region where they live, the financial position of the IDB in that country, the macroeconomic 
conditions, and interviewees’ political orientation and attitudes toward democracy and the free 
market. Thus, the emphasis is on understanding how individuals and countries differ in their 
knowledge and evaluation of the IDB, both in absolute terms and relative to the World Bank and 
IMF.  
                                                       
1 The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic.  
2 The other institutions are Mercosur, ALCA, Mercado Común Centroamericano, Pacto Andino, the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States.   5
The 2001 sample comprised 18,135 individuals who were at least 16 years old and 
covered 17 countries.
4 The survey was conducted in April and May. The timing is relevant for 
interpretation of the results since important subsequent events, such as the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, the war in Iraq, the global economic slowdown and Argentina’s default, may have 
altered Latin Americans’ perceptions of international organizations.  
 The results indicate both good and bad news for the IDB. Negatively, it is the least-
known of the three international organizations; but positively, it is the best rated among those 
familiar with them. Among countries in the sample, Uruguay had the largest fraction of people 
knowing the IDB, and Colombia the lowest. In terms of grading IDB, Nicaraguans gave the 
highest and Argentines the lowest marks.  
Demographic variables and socioeconomic levels are important determinants of who 
knows the IDB, the IMF and the Word Bank. Older, more-educated, wealthier men are more 
likely to know the institutions.  
Conversely, in terms of grading, the demographic characteristics of the respondent seem 
to have no significant impact, but economic status does (wealthier individuals tend to rate the 
IDB higher). Macroeconomic conditions matter (to some extent) for institutional grading. People 
from countries with higher growth gave higher grades. Nonetheless, the rates of unemployment 
and inflation did not have a significant impact. The political orientation of the respondent also 
correlated with the grade assigned. People from the right, those who believe privatizations were 
beneficial for their countries, and those with a good opinion of the United States gave the IDB 
higher scores. Finally, middle-class people and women tended to give a higher grade to the IDB 
than to the World Bank, while people who read and watch the news more often rated the World 
Bank better. Not surprisingly, countries with higher growth and lower inflation tended to give 
higher grades to the IMF (vis-à-vis the IDB).  
The analysis in this paper proceeds as follows. First, the database is described and the 
methodology is outlined. Then econometric analyses are performed to answer three questions: 
Who knows the IDB, who likes the IDB, and who rates the IDB higher than its comparators. An 
appendix is included, describing the variables used in the analysis.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 In 1996, 1998 and 2000, none of the international financial institutions was included; and the questionnaire only 
asks whether the respondent has heard or read about the institution, rather than asking for grading. The 2003 survey 
only includes the IMF. 
4 The Dominican Republic was included in 2004.    6
2. Data and Methodology 
 
The Latinobarómetro surveys are conducted by national polling firms in each country using 
comparable sampling methodologies and the same questionnaire across countries. Different 
individuals are interviewed every year and several questions are replaced in each annual survey. 
The sample size by country varied from 1,000 to 1,200, with the exception of Panama, which had 
a sample of 603 individuals. 
In most cases, the samples are representative across gender, socioeconomic status and 
age, especially in recent years.
5 Nonetheless, some limitations discussed in previous studies 
using this data source (for example, Panizza and Yañez, 2005) are worth mentioning here. First, 
early surveys focused exclusively on urban populations. In 2000, coverage was extended 
nationwide in all countries except Chile, Colombia and Paraguay, where the survey remains only 
urban (urban populations in these countries represent 86 percent, 75 percent and 55 percent of 
total population, respectively).
6 A second problem is that until 2002, the surveys were conducted 
only in a country’s official language (Spanish or Portuguese). This may have induced lower 
participation by indigenous populations that do not speak those languages. Finally, some 
evidence shows that samples overrepresented more-educated individuals, at least in early years 
(Gaviria, Panizza and Seddon, 2004). 
A detailed description of the variables used in the analysis is presented in the Appendix,  
including their sample means and standard deviations. The demographic and socioeconomic 
variables include gender, age, education, wealth quintile, an index that reflects how often the 
respondent read and watched the news, and indicators for indigenous groups, heads of 
households, rural populations and people living in the capital city of the country. The general 
socioeconomic status of the individual is measured by the interviewer’s perception, which is 
based on the respondent’s general appearance and housing conditions. The macroeconomic 
variables included GDP growth, inflation and unemployment. Finally, country dummy variables 
were added to all the regression specifications (except those including macro variables) to 
capture national idiosyncratic effects. 
Two alternative geographical categories were examined, following IDB classifications. 
The first, based on the Bank’s regional departments, considers Region 1 excluding Brazil 
                                                       
5 In 2001, the sample was representative nationwide in 9 out of the 17 countries. The lowest representations were in 
Bolivia (52 percent), Peru (52 percent) and Paraguay (46 percent).   7
(Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay), Brazil, Region 2 excluding Mexico (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama), Mexico, and Region 3 
(Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador). The second category is based on the IDB grouping 
of borrowing countries and is divided into Group A (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela), 
Group B (Chile, Colombia and Peru), Group C (Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, and Group D 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). 
 
3. Who Knows the IDB? 
According to the Latinobarómetro data, the IDB is the least known of the three international 
organizations included. As shown in Figure 1, 35.4 percent of sample respondents express 
knowledge of IDB, while 38.5 percent and 39.6 percent know the IMF and World Bank, 
respectively (with the gaps being statistically significant). 
Region 1 (excluding Brazil) displayed the greatest knowledge of the IDB among the 
regions, with 43 percent of its sample recognizing the Bank. Nonetheless, this figure is still 
below those for the IMF and World Bank in the same region (see Figure 2). In all regions the 
percentage of people who know the IDB is below that for the other international organizations. 
 








                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Latinobarómetro announced that in 2006 the survey in Chile will also have national coverage.   8













Group A Group B Group C Group D
IDB IMF WB
 
At the country level, Uruguay has the largest fraction of people familiar with the IDB 
(almost 57 percent), and Colombia has the lowest (around 17 percent). Knowledge is highly 
correlated across institutions (that is, those regions that know one institution are more likely to 
know the others as well). 
   9
Figure 3. Knowledge of the Institutions by Country 
 
To understand what explains the differences of familiarity with the international 
organizations among Latin Americans, a regression analysis was followed. The dependent 
variable is defined as an indicator that equals 1 if the respondent knows the institution and 0 if 
he/she does not.  
The results (Table 1) show that older people have a higher probability of knowing the 
IDB (at a decreasing rate, with each additional year of age increasing the likelihood of knowing 
the IDB, but with an impact greater for younger than for older individuals). Women and less-
educated people are less familiar with the institution. Women are 9 percent less likely than men 
to know the IDB. The impact is very similar for the World Bank and IMF. When compared with 
respondents who have no education, people with primary schooling are 6.3 percent more likely 
to know the IDB. Measured against the same baseline, the impact is 18 percent for high school 
graduates and 31 percent for college graduates.   
There is no significant difference for indigenous people. In other words, they are equally 
likely to know the IDB (and the other institutions) as nonindigenous respondents, controlling for 
all other characteristics. However, as mentioned above, this group might not be well represented 
in the sample.  
Wealthier individuals know the IDB better. People in the top quintile of wealth have a 17 
percent higher probability of knowing the institution than those in the lowest quintile. This is a   10
considerable difference since it is in addition to the effect from the higher educational levels of 
wealthier individuals. As expected, reading and watching the news more often has a significant 
impact (one standard deviation change in this index increases the probability of knowing the IDB 
by 7 percent).  
People living in capital cities have better knowledge of the IDB, and there is no 
significant difference for those living in rural areas.
7 People classified by the pollster as having a 
regular socioeconomic level have lower chances of knowing the IDB than those with a good 
socioeconomic level, even after controlling for education, wealth and the other variables. In 
contrast, people with a low socioeconomic level are equally likely to know the IDB as the group 
with a good socioeconomic level.  
After controlling for cross-regional demographic and socioeconomic differences, Region 
3 has the highest knowledge of the IDB (3.5 percent more than Region 1 without Brazil). People 
living in Region 2 (excluding Mexico) have the lowest probability of knowing the institution. 
This result is the same for the IMF and World Bank. A different regression specification (not 
shown) demonstrates that after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 
Uruguayans still are the most likely to know of the IDB and Chileans are the least likely.  
 
                                                       
7 The finding for rural areas is probably affected by their underrepresentation in the sample.   11
Table 1. OLS Regressions, “Do you know the following institution?” 
 
Age 0.007 *** 0.003 * 0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age
2 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 **
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Woman -0.094 *** -0.086 *** -0.103 ***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Head 0.013 0.000 -0.013
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Primary 0.063 *** 0.075 ** 0.073 ***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.019)
Secondary 0.183 *** 0.204 *** 0.196 ***
(0.026) (0.036) (0.027)
College 0.310 *** 0.316 *** 0.309 ***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
Indigenous 0.002 0.014 -0.013
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Quintile 2 0.045 *** 0.048 ** 0.029 *
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
Quintile 3 0.089 *** 0.081 *** 0.084 ***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
Quintile 4 0.109 *** 0.126 *** 0.114 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027)
Quintile 5 0.173 *** 0.185 *** 0.166 ***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Soc_ec (regular) -0.044 *** -0.039 ** -0.02
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Soc_ec (bad) -0.026 -0.043 ** -0.035 *
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Informed 0.111 *** 0.104 *** 0.104 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Rural 0.019 0.005 0.017
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
Capital 0.075 *** 0.086 *** 0.082 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Brazil -0.037 *** -0.150 *** -0.064 ***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
Region 2 (excl. Mexico) -0.112 *** -0.477 *** -0.301 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Mexico -0.069 *** -0.330 *** -0.108 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Region 3 0.035 *** -0.162 *** -0.096 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 15,673                  15,673                    15,673                   
R-squared 0.18 0.23 0.18
Regressions include constant and country dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
IDB IMF World Bank
 
 
4. Who Likes the IDB? 
Although it is the least known among the three international organizations, the IDB appears to be 
better liked in Latin America. On a 1-to -10 scale (where 1 is very bad and 10 is very good) the 
average grade given to the IDB by people who know the organization is 6 points, compared to 
5.4 to the IMF and 5.8 to the World Bank (see Figure 4). The differences are small but 
statistically significant. This result holds even when comparing the average grade among those   12
who know the three institutions. That is, the samples of people reporting to know each institution 
are not necessarily the same across the IMF, IDB and World Bank. First, as previously noted, the 
number of individuals who know the IDB is around 12 percent lower than those who know the 
World Bank and 9 percent lower than those who know the IMF. Second, despite considerable 
correlation across institutions, some individuals may know one institution and not the others, so 
the average grades may be calculated over quite different samples. Consequently, it is interesting 
to know how grades compare for those who report knowing the three institutions. For this 
specific subsample (4,546 individuals), the average grades are 5.9 for the IDB, 5.4 for the IMF, 
and 5.6 for the World Bank (the differences are still statistically significant). 
 








Among the regions, the highest grade for IDB was given by Region 2  (excluding 
Mexico)  and the lowest was given by Region 1 (excluding Brazil), as shown in Figure 5. Grades 
are correlated across organizations (that is, those regions that give a high grade to one institution 
tend to give higher grades to the others as well). In terms of countries, the highest grade was 
given by Nicaragua (7.6) and the lowest by Argentina (3.9). Average grades by country are 
presented in Figure 6. 
     13
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Figure 6. Average Grade by Country 
 
 
To understand how people grade the institutions, both in absolute and comparative terms, 
a regression analysis was followed. The dependent variable is the grade each individual gave the 
IDB. The sample includes only those individuals who reported knowing each institution.  Table 2 
presents separate regressions for each institution, including as regressors only demographic, 
socioeconomic and geographic variables. The results show that education and wealth are the only 
individual characteristics that have a significant impact on the grading of the IDB. Respondents 
with more education tend to give lower grades, on average. The only significant effect is found 
among high-school graduates, whose average grade is 2 points lower than those with no 
education. In terms of wealth, the only significant difference was between the highest and lowest 
quintile (the highest quintile’s average grade is 2.9 points higher than the lowest quintile. The 
other demographic and socioeconomic variables do not seem to influence people’s grading. 
Individuals with different age, gender, household position, ethnicity, information level, or 
socioeconomic status do not systematically differ in their perception of the Bank. Findings for 
the IMF and World Bank are similar, with the exception of age (older individuals give lower 
grades, on average).  
The findings imply that the main source of grade variation derives from country and 
regional differences. Thus, even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic   15
differences, Region 2 and Region 1 still give the highest and lowest grade to the IDB, 
respectively. Similarly, Nicaragua is the country with the highest and Argentina is the country 
with the lowest grade.
8     
In Table 3, regression variants for the IDB grade only are presented. The first column the 
country group classification is included instead of regional dummies. The results are not affected 
by this change. In the second and third column, regressions incorporate macroeconomic variables 
including real GDP growth, overall unemployment rate, and adjusted inflation (all measured in 
2000).
9 When regional dummies are also included (column 3), the coefficient for all the macro 
variables are not statistically significant. This is in part because of the correlation between the 
regional dummies and the macro variables. When the regional dummies are omitted, GDP 
growth has a significant positive impact on the grading (countries with one percentage point 
more of GDP growth gave 1.4 point higher grade, on average).
10 Finally, the regression of the 
last column includes some measures of the political orientation of the individual and his/her 
attitude towards democracy and free-market. The results show that people who consider 
themselves from the right and center-right tend to rate the IDB better (their average grade is 
around half a point higher than left extremists, keeping all the other characteristics constant). 
Similarly, those individuals who believe privatizations were beneficial for their countries 
presented, on average, a 0.3 higher grade than those who do not. Lastly, there is a substantial 
correlation between the grade and the opinion people have on the United Sates. Other things 
being equal, having a good or very good opinion on United States increased the average IDB 
grade by 1 point.
11    
 
                                                       
8 Countries’ fixed effects are not shown.  
9 Adjusted inflation is computed as 1 – (1/(1 + CPI inflation rate). This is done to moderate the impact of outliers, 
mainly driven by Ecuador that had a 96 percent inflation rate in 2000.  
10 The significance of this coefficient disappears if the output gap is used as a measure of economic activity instead 
of GDP growth. The output gap is computed as the percentage difference of the GDP relative to its trend (calculated 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter over the period 1970–2001)     
11 It is important to note that the survey was held in April and May of 2001, before the September 11 terrorist attacks 
and before the war in Iraq. This makes this period quite “neutral.” Of those who responded to this question, 82 
percent had a favorable or very favorable opinion of the U.S.    16
Table 2. OLS Regressions for IDB, IMF and World Bank Grades 
Grade
Age -0.020 -0.050 *** -0.051 ***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Age
2 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.135 0.138 0.083
(0.090) (0.079) (0.059)
Head -0.050 0.025 0.044
(0.103) (0.086) (0.056)
Primary -0.038 0.002 -0.071
(0.098) (0.129) (0.144)
Secondary -0.209 ** -0.139 -0.305 **
(0.096) (0.131) (0.116)
College -0.195 -0.007 -0.252
(0.152) (0.183) (0.153)
Indigenous 0.020 -0.113 -0.156
(0.137) (0.112) (0.117)
Quintile 2 -0.110 0.015 -0.042
(0.094) (0.077) (0.117)
Quintile 3 0.028 -0.121 -0.042
(0.109) (0.122) (0.110)
Quintile 4 -0.004 0.043 0.116
(0.084) (0.114) (0.141)
Quintile 5 0.291 ** 0.212 * 0.202 **
(0.115) (0.107) (0.095)
Soc_ec (regular) 0.052 0.148 0.026
(0.108) (0.104) (0.103)
Soc_ec (bad) 0.108 0.280 0.163
(0.151) (0.174) (0.139)
Informed -0.057 0.048 0.046
(0.048) (0.056) (0.045)
Rural -0.194 -0.063 -0.038
(0.300) (0.205) (0.172)
Capital -0.102 -0.165 -0.101
(0.149) (0.137) (0.151)
Brazil 1.770 *** 1.042 *** 1.747 ***
(0.059) (0.068) (0.063)
Region 2 (excl. Mexico) 2.938 *** 2.156 *** 2.642 ***
(0.040) (0.023) (0.044)
Mexico 2.006 *** 2.361 *** 2.236 ***
(0.061) (0.046) (0.053)
Region 3 2.616 *** 2.474 *** 2.839 ***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 5,655        6,086        6,251       
R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
IDB IMF WB  17
Table 3. Regression Variants for IDB Grading, Including Macro and Political Variables 
IDB grade (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.020 -0.024 * -0.023 -0.023 *
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Age
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.135 0.128 0.100 0.106
(0.090) (0.088) (0.082) (0.101)
Head -0.050 -0.045 -0.019 -0.092
(0.103) (0.102) (0.110) (0.072)
Primary -0.038 -0.232 * -0.242 * 0.056
(0.098) (0.116) (0.130) (0.098)
Secondary -0.209 ** -0.348 ** -0.317 * -0.141
(0.096) (0.133) (0.168) (0.096)
College -0.195 -0.140 -0.134 -0.193
(0.152) (0.174) (0.156) (0.132)
Indigenous 0.020 -0.021 -0.117 0.054
(0.137) (0.157) (0.185) (0.123)
Quintile 2 -0.110 -0.080 -0.132 0.000
(0.094) (0.097) (0.092) (0.132)
Quintile 3 0.028 0.117 0.178 0.068
(0.109) (0.114) (0.137) (0.129)
Quintile 4 -0.004 0.064 0.103 0.040
(0.084) (0.093) (0.112) (0.106)
Quintile 5 0.291 ** 0.418 ** 0.548 *** 0.340 **
(0.115) (0.144) (0.146) (0.157)
Soc_ec (regular) 0.052 0.228 0.284 * 0.162
(0.108) (0.142) (0.137) (0.110)
Soc_ec (bad) 0.108 0.402 * 0.319 0.310 **
(0.151) (0.203) (0.208) (0.128)
Informed -0.057 -0.033 -0.186 0.012
(0.048) (0.052) (0.113) (0.052)
Rural -0.194 -0.500 -0.246 -0.175
(0.300) (0.389) (0.378) (0.269)
Capital -0.102 -0.142 -0.163 -0.011
(0.149) (0.174) (0.161) (0.153)
Brazil -0.060 1.324 ***
(0.437) (0.068)
Region 2 (excl. Mexico) 1.136 *** 1.901 ***
(0.381) (0.093)
Mexico 0.003 1.716 ***
(0.640) (0.081)
Region 3 0.236 1.438 ***
(0.336) (0.088)
Group B 1.813 ***
(0.040)
Group C 2.869 ***
(0.024)
Group D 2.017 ***
(0.050)
























USA 1.039 ***  18
5. Who Likes the IDB Better than the IMF or the World Bank? 
To conclude, this section presents a comparative analysis of the grades received by the IDB and 
the IMF/World Bank. In this case, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the 
grade given to the IDB exceeds the grade given to the IMF (or World Bank) and zero otherwise. 
The results are presented in Table 4. Column 1 shows a regression including only 
demographic, socioeconomic and regional variables. Relative to the World Bank, the middle 
class (individuals with a regular socioeconomic level) rates the IDB better than do people with 
low socioeconomic status. Women also tend to give a higher grade to the IDB than to the World 
Bank. Better-informed people are less likely to give a higher grade to the IDB than to the World 
Bank. In terms of education, high-school and college graduates assign a higher relative rate to 
the World Bank than do people with no education. Among the regions, Regions 2 and 3 are more 
likely than Region 1 to give a lower grade to the IDB than to the World Bank. 
In Column 2, the macroeconomic variables are added to the regression. Interestingly, the 
economic variables have a significant (and robust) impact on the relative grade of the IDB vis-à-
vis the IMF. Countries with higher GDP growth and lower inflation are more likely to give a 
higher grade to the IMF. This effect disappears in the regressions comparing the IDB with the 
World Bank.  
Finally, the regressions in Column 3 include political variables. Political orientation and 
attitudes toward the free market are not correlated with the relative grades among the institutions. 
This means that political orientation matters when grading the international organizations in 
absolute terms, but not in comparisons among them.   19
Table 4. Regression Variants in Grading the IDB Relative to the IMF and WB 
 
 
Age 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Age
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Woman 0.003 3.000 ** 0.006 0.046 ** 0.025 0.044 **
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
Head -0.035 -0.021 -0.033 -0.020 -0.030 -0.013
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Primary -0.004 -0.038 -0.002 -0.023 -0.013 -0.039
(0.019) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.033)
Secondary -0.013 -0.051 * 0.000 -0.026 -0.032 -0.045
(0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.024) (0.028)
College 0.026 -0.079 * 0.046 -0.061 0.020 -0.060
(0.018) (0.040) (0.028) (0.039) (0.022) (0.042)
Indigenous 0.029 -0.006 0.030 0.006 0.021 -0.001
(0.030) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023)
Quintile 2 0.034 -0.012 0.037 -0.012 0.050 -0.006
(0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.043) (0.030)
Quintile 3 0.062 * 0.001 0.069 * -0.005 0.058 0.003
(0.035) (0.024) (0.034) (0.026) (0.052) (0.030)
Quintile 4 0.051 * 0.007 0.060 ** 0.006 0.042 0.006
(0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.038) (0.025)
Quintile 5 0.054 -0.028 0.066 * -0.031 0.042 -0.020
(0.037) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.055) (0.034)
Soc_ec (regular) -0.001 0.054 ** 0.008 0.047 ** -0.020 0.055 ***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Soc_ec (bad) -0.022 -0.008 -0.007 -0.017 -0.049 -0.006
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031)
Informed -0.011 -0.079 *** -0.015 -0.082 *** -0.011 -0.070 ***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Rural -0.015 -0.081 * -0.015 -0.087 * 0.003 -0.029
(0.031) (0.042) (0.031) (0.043) (0.049) (0.052)
Capital -0.002 -0.027 -0.009 -0.033 -0.008 -0.023
(0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
Brazil 0.160 *** 0.022 * 0.203 *** 0.090 ** 0.151 *** -0.018
(0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.039) (0.014) (0.013)
Region 2 (excl. Mexico) -0.061 *** -0.102 *** -0.013 -0.101 ** -0.079 *** -0.140 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.034) (0.043) (0.015) (0.010)
Mexico -0.006 0.022 * 0.049 0.092 * -0.017 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.042) (0.051) (0.015) (0.015)
Region 3 -0.107 *** -0.141 *** 0.011 -0.031 -0.013 -0.037 **
(0.008) (0.011) (0.027) (0.038) (0.019) (0.013)


























Observations 4,413            6,251            4,413            6,251            3,397            4,694           
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06
1Include country dummies
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6. Appendix 












No education / basic inc. 25% 43%
Basic complete / secondary inc. 37% 48%
Secondary compl / college inc 32% 47%
College complete 7% 25%
Rural 7% 25%
Capital 24% 43%
Region 1 (excl. Brazil) 54% 45%
Brazil 6% 23%
Region 2 (excl. Mexico) 33% 47%
Mexico 7% 25%
Region 3 25% 44%
Group A 26% 44%
Group B 19% 39%
Group C 18% 38%
Group D 38% 49%
Soc_ec 1 (good) 40% 49%
Soc_ec 2 (regular) 42% 49%












GDP growth 2.9% 2.1%
Inflation 12.8% 22.6%
Unemployment 9.4% 4.9%  21
Variable Description  Scale 
Age, Age
2/100  Years of age, and years-of-age squared divided by 100   
Woman, head, 
indigenous 
Constructed as dummy variables for women, heads of 
household, and self-reported indigenous 
 
Informed  Constructed as the principal component of the questions: 
How many days in a week do you read the news in the 
newspapers? How many days per week do you watch the 
news on TV? How many days per week do you listen to the 
news on the radio? 
Continuous variable. Min: -1.07; Max: 
1.25 
Wealth  quintile  Constructed based on the principal component of the 
reported asset holdings  
 
Education  Level of education  1 – no education / primary incomplete 
(base group) 
2 – primary complete / secondary 
incomplete 
3 – secondary complete / college 
incomplete 
4 – college complete 
Soc_ec  Pollster’s assessment of the socioeconomic level of the 
individual, based on quality of housing, quality of furniture, 
and general appearance of the individual.  
1 – good (base group) 
2 – regular  
3 - bad 
Rural  Constructed from variable tamciu (size of city)  1 – city with less than 5,000 people  
0 – otherwise 
Capital  Constructed from variable tamciu (size of city)  1 – capital city 
0 - otherwise 
Region 1 (excluding 
Brazil) 
Constructed based on IDB regional departments  1  –  Argentina,  Chile,  Uruguay,  Bolivia 
and Paraguay 
0 - otherwise  
Brazil   1  –  Brazil 
0 - otherwise 
Region 2 (excluding 
Mexico) 
Constructed based on IDB regional departments  1 – Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
0 - otherwise 
Mexico   1  –  Mexico 
0 - otherwise 
Region 3  Constructed based on IDB regional departments  1  –  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Venezuela  and 
Peru 
0 - otherwise 
Democracy  Are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in your 
country? 
1 – satisfied / very satisfied 
0 – dissatisfied / very dissatisfied 
U.S.  Do you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion of 
the United States? 
1 – good / very good 
0 – bad / very bad 
Privat  Do you agree with the following statement: Privatization of 
public companies was beneficial for the country? 
1 – agree 
0 - disagree 
Prices  Do you agree with the following statement: Prices should be 
set by free competition in the market? 
1 – agree 
0 - disagree 
Privprod  Do you agree with the following statement: The state should 
leave productive activity to the private sector? 
1 – agree 
0 - disagree   22
FDI  Do you agree with the following statement: The government 
should promote foreign investment? 
1 – agree 
0 - disagree 
Political orientation 
scale 
Constructed based on the following question: On a scale of 0 
to 10, how right-left would you consider yourself? 
0–1 equals left extremists 
2-4  equals center-left 
5 equals center 
6-8 equals center-right 
9-10 equals right extremists 
GDP growth  Real GDP growth in 2000   
Inflation adjusted  Computed as  
1 - (1/(1 + CPI inflation in 2000) 
 
Unemployment  General unemployment rate in 2000   
Approved loans IDB  Total amount of IDB loans approved for the country during 
2000 (per capita) 
 
Executed loans IDB  Total amount of IDB loans executed in the country during 
2000 (per capita) 
 
IDB disbursements  Total amount of IDB disbursements in the country during 
2000 (per capita) 
 
 
 
 